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Question Paper
Integrated Case Studies - II
(MB3J2) : January 2009
Case Study∗ (100 Marks)
• This
section consists of questions with serial number 1 - 5.
• Answer
all questions.
• Marks are
indicated against each question.
Read the case carefully and answer the following
questions:
1. a. |
The panel believes that BP has not provided effective
safety culture and has not adequately |
|
<Answer |
||
1 mark |
> |
|
|||
|
established process safety as a core value across
all its U S refineries. In this context, |
|
|||
|
|
|
|
||
|
explain
the significance of safety culture with respect to personal and process
safety. |
( 0 s) |
|
|
|
b.
What according to you could be
the essential elements of a strong safety culture and in the light of these
elements, discuss the failure of BP. Also, in your opinion, what should Tony
Hayward do to counter the criticisms raised against BP’s process safety systems
and culture?
2.
In 2000 BP Amoco rebranded itself
as “bp: beyond petroleum” which earned rich accolades for BP. However, some of
its critics dismissed it as a “greenwashing” effort. In this regard, discuss
whether BP’s move was an indicator of being environmental friendly company or a
cynical attempt to manage its reputation i.e., a PR gimmick to improve image.
3.
The case refers to the expression
“It-can’t-happen-here” and the concept of “Step-up supervisors”
1 mark
( 2 s)
<Answer
>
2 marks (
0 )
<Answer
>
a.
Discuss, according to you, how an HR manager can
deal with the “It-can’t-happen-here” 1 mark
|
mentality
which is widespread in an organization. |
( 0 |
s) |
b. |
Discuss
the rationale behind using “Step-up supervisors” in day-to-day operations. |
1 mark |
|
|
|
( 0 |
s) |
4.
BP encountered a decline in its
production levels and the company’s share price after a series of accidents in
their refineries. Explain the impacts (in terms of financial, operational,
etc.) of not adhering to safety and also explain the short-term measures taken
by BP to deal with the accidents.
<Answer
>
1 marks (
8 )
5. a. |
The concept
of sustainable development
is becoming synonymous
with corporate |
|
<Answer |
||
1 mark |
> |
|
|||
|
responsibility and best
business practices. Elucidate the reasons for an organization to have |
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an
integrated and responsible approach to governance, ethics and sustainability. |
( 0 s) |
|
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|
b.
Recent safety crises in BP refineries in Texas and
Pudhore Bay in Alaska have turned the
spotlight
on core values such as governance, ethics and sustainability. Why did BP fail
to |
|
live up
to the expectations of superior core values? Also, discuss the probable
guidelines |
1 mark |
for
effective governance that should be put in place by BP for the adherence of
the core |
|
values. |
( 0 s) |
BP:
Putting Profits Before Safety?
"What BP experienced was a
perfect storm, where aging infrastructure, overzealous cost-cutting, inadequate
design and risk-blindness, all converged."1
– Carolyn Merritt, Chairman of the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board, 2 in 2006.
“Based on
its review, the Panel believes that BP has not provided effective process
safety leadership and has not adequately established process safety as a core
value across all its five U.S. refineries.
*The above case is prepared only
for the purpose of examination and not to illustrate effective or ineffective
performance of the company. The case contains factual information adapted to
and combined with other information to enable analysis of the given topics.
Page 1 of 25
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1
“Cost-cutting led to BP Refinery
Fire, Report Concludes,” www.pbs.org, November 01, 2006.
2
The US Chemical Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board, headquartered in Washington, USA, is a federal agency that
is responsible for conducting investigations of industrial chemical accidents
in the US.
3
4
“The Report of the BP US
Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel,” www.bp.com, January, 2007.
The UK Health and Safety Commission defines safety
culture as “the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions,
competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and
the style and proficiency of, an organisation’s health and safety management.”
(Source: www.en.wikipedia.org)
5
To help assure safe and healthful
workplaces, US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has issued
the Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals regulations which
contain requirements for the management of hazards associated with processes
using highly hazardous chemicals.
6
“BP Safety Standards ‘Wholly
Inadequate’,” www.inthenews.co.uk, January 16, 2007.
7
Exxon Mobil Corporation,
headquartered in Irving, Texas, USA, is the largest publicly traded integrated
oil and gas company in the world.
8
Royal Dutch Shell Plc.,
headquartered at The Hague, The Netherlands, is the world’s second largest oil
company.
9
“BP Surprises by Naming Successor
for CEO Early,” www.taipeitimes.com, January 14, 2007.
10
“Safety at Oregon’s BP Plant,”
www.13abc.com, January 17, 2007.
11 Sonja Franklin, “BP’s Browne Failed on Refinery Safety, Panel Reports
(Update 5),” www.bloomberg.com, January 16, 2007.
12
The Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration is an agency under the US Department of
transportation.
13
In the pipeline industry, a
pipeline inspection gauge (or pig) is a tool that is sent down a pipeline and
propelled by the pressure of the product in the pipeline itself. It is the
chief device used in pigging (maintenance of pipelines using pigs to perform
various operations on a pipeline without stopping the flow of the product in
the pipeline).
14
“Oil Giant Told to Fix Pipelines
after Alaska Spill,” www.msnbc.msn.com, March 23, 2006.
15 A whistleblower is someone (most often an employee, former employee,
etc.,) who provides information about an employer’s supposed misconduct.
16 “As BP’s Hayward Takes Helm, His Priorities Should be Clear,”
www.wsj.com, January, 2007.
17
Amoco Oil Corporation was a
global oil and gasoline conglomerate founded in 1889 by John Rockefeller. The
company was initially incorporated as Standard Oil of Indiana which was formed
from the break-up of Standard Oil Co.
18
Burmah Oil Company was a British
oil company which was founded in Glasgow, Scotland, in 1886. The company
acquired the Castrol Company in 1966. After this acquisition, the company was
called Burmah Castrol Plc.
19
Valdez oil terminal, an oil port
in Valdez, Alaska, was acquired by the British Petroleum Company from Chugach
(it was the name of a native culture and group of people in the Kenai Peninsula
and Prince William Sound regions of Alaska).
20
Standard Oil was an American oil
company also called Sohio. It was one of the successor companies to Standard
Oil founded by John Rockefeller. BP took up a 25 percent stake in the company
in 1969 and the remaining in 1987.
21
In October 1973, members of the
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries including Egypt and Syria
decided not to export petroleum to countries (like the US and other West
European countries) that had supported Israel in its conflict with Syria and
Egypt (Source: www.en.wikipedia.org).
22 Selection Trust, a British based mining finance house, was formed in
1913 by Chester Beatty. The company mainly financed and developed mining
operations worldwide. The company’s team of geologists and mining engineers
were sent across the world to discover areas that could be explored for
minerals.
23
Atle Christer Christiansen,
“Beyond Petroleum: Can BP Deliver,” www.fni.no, June 2002.
24
Helios is the sun god in Greek
mythology.
25
The company thought that the
upper case BP gave an imperialist impression. By shifting to ‘bp’ which was in
lower case, the company wanted to project itself as a friendly company.
26
Greenwashing is a term that
environmentalists and other critics give to the activity of giving a positive
public image to supposed environmentally unsound practices.
27 TJ Aulds, “BP Refinery Manager No Stranger to Challenges,”
www.galvestondailynews.com, January 30, 2007.
28 “Safety at Oregon’s BP Plant,” www.13abc.com, January 17, 2007.
29
Laurel Brubaker Calkins and
Margaret Cronin Fisk, “BP Faces Growing Criminal Probe over Texas Refinery
(Update 3),” www.bloomberg.com, January 29, 2007.
30
The US Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) is an agency of the US Department of Labor. OSHA’s
mission is to prevent work-related injuries, illnesses, and deaths by issuing
and enforcing rules for workplace safety and health.
31
John Porretto, “Report: Deadly
Fire Followed BP Safety Failure,” www.jacksonholestartrib.com, January, 2007.
32
Micheal Harrison, “Texas Report
to Maul BP Management,” www.independent.co.uk, January 15, 2007.
33
Katy Byron, “BP Chided in Report
on Fatal Texas Fire,” www.money.cnn.com, October 31, 2006.
34
“Safety at Oregon’s BP Plant,”
www.13abc.com, January 17, 2007.
Page 2 of 25
35 Roger Shrives, “BP Condemned over
Safety Standards,” www.socialistparty.org.uk, February 1, 2007.
36
Katherine Torres, “Panel Finds BP
Lacking in Safety Leadership,” www.occupationalhazards.com, January 17, 2007.
37 Abrahm Lustgarten, “What Went Wrong at Prudhoe Bay,” www.money.cnn.com,
August 21, 2006.
38 David Robertson, “BP Failed to Learn from Mistakes, Panel Says,”
www.business.timesonline.com, January 17, 2007.
39
Sonja Franklin, “BP’s Browne
Failed on Refinery Safety, panel Reports (Update 5),” www.bloomberg.com,
January 16, 2007.
40
“Alaska Hit by ‘Massive’ Oil
Spill,” www.news.bbc.co.uk, March 11, 2006.
41
The Exxon Valdez oil spill was
the most devastating environmental disaster to occur at sea. On March 24, 1989,
the oil tanker Exxon Valdez spilled its contents into the sea affecting 1,900
km of the Alaskan coastline. About 30 million US gallons (1US gallon = 3.785
litres) of crude oil were spilled, affecting the marine ecology as well as the
lives of Alaskan fishermen. Exxon spent some US$2 billion cleaning up the
spill, and a further US$1 billion to settle civil and criminal charges related
to the case. In 1994, an Anchorage jury awarded the fishermen and affected
communities US$5 billion in punitive damages. Exxon appealed against the
ruling, claiming that the amount was excessive and unjustified. On December
2002, the damages were reduced to US$4 billion. As of March, 2007, Exxon had
avoided paying the fine.
42
“Oil Giant Told to Fix Pipelines
after Alaska Spill,” www.msnbc.msn.com, March 23, 2006.
43 “Prices Climbing after Oil Field Shutdown,” www.cnn.com, August 9, 2006.
44 Wesley Loy and Richard Richtmyer, “Massive Repairs on the Slope,”
www.adn.com, August 8, 2006.
45
Abrahm Lustgarten, “What Went
Wrong at Prudhoe Bay,” www.money.cnn.com, August 21, 2006.
46
Nelson Schwartz, “BP was Warned,”
www.money.cnn.com, October 2, 2006.
47
Stephen Voss, Bloomberg News, “BP
Oil Production Declines for Sixth Consecutive Quarter,” www.iht.com, January
10, 2007.
48
RCM is a division of Allianz
Global Investors.
49 Nick Bevens, “Browne’s Exit Expected to Boost Lagging BP,”
www.business.scotsman.com, January 16, 2007.
50
Stephen Voss, Bloomberg News, “BP
Oil Production Declines for Sixth Consecutive Quarter,” www.iht.com, January
10, 2007.
51
TNK-BP is a leading oil company
in Russia. It was formed in 2003 as a result of a merger between BP’s oil and
gas assets in Russia and the oil and gas assets of the Alfa Access Renova
group. (Source: www.tnk-bp.com).
52
“BP Surprises by Naming Successor
for CEO Early,” www.taipeitimes.com, January 14, 2007.
53
“BP Surprises by Naming Successor
for CEO Early,” www.taipeitimes.com, January 14, 2007.
54
Royal London Asset Management is
the wholly owned asset management subsidiary of The Royal London Mutual
Insurance Society (Royal London), the second largest mutual life insurer in the
UK. (Source: www.scottishlife.co.uk)
55
“BP Surprises by Naming Successor
for CEO Early,” www.taipeitimes.com, January 14, 2007.
56
Simon Bowers, “BP Braced for
Fallout as Safety Report Threatens to Implicate Board,”
www.business.guardian.co.uk, January 15, 2007.
57
Oppenheimer & Co. Inc.,
headquartered at New York, USA, is a leading investment boutique that provides
financial services and advice to high net worth investors, individuals,
businesses, and institutions.
58 ING Group, headquartered in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, is a financial
institution that offers banking, insurance, and asset management services
59 Mike Elliott, “BP Chief’s Early Exit Ends Uncertainty,” www.stuff.co.nz,
January 17, 2007.
60
Liz Chong and Robin Pagnamenta,
“BP Told to Expect More Departures after Texas Blast Report,”
www.business.timesonline.co.uk, January 15, 2007.
61
John M Biers, “Report Shows
Downside of BP’s Refinery-light Strategy,” www.marketwatch.com, January 17,
2007.
62
Katherine Torres, “Panel Finds BP
Lacking in Safety Leadership,” www.occupationalhazards.com, January 17, 2007.
63
David Robertson, “BP Failed to
Learn from Mistakes, Panel Says,” www.business.timesonline.com, January 17,
2007.
64
“Safety at Oregon’s BP Plant,”
www.13abc.com, January 17, 2007.
65
“BP Attacked over Plant Death
Blast,” www.icsouthlondon.co.uk, January 16, 2007.
66
“BP Safety Standards ‘Wholly
Inadequate’,” www.inthenews.co.uk, January 16, 2007.
67
The US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) is an agency of the federal government of the US. It is charged
with protecting human health and with safeguarding the natural environment:
air, water, and land.
68
Ciat Murphy, “Beyond Prudhoe: Why
BP Should Go Back to Being an Oil Company,” www.money.cnn.com, August 15, 2006.
69
Nelson Schwartz, “Can BP Bounce
Back?” www.money.cnn.com, October 31, 2006.
70
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
(ANWR) covers 19,049,236 acres (79,318 km²) in northeastern Alaska, in the
North Slope region. It is endowed with rich natural resources. There was a
controversy as to whether to allow drilling in the ANWR. Drilling was finally
allowed in 2006.
71
Aaron Smith, “BP ‘Fell Short’ on
Pipeline, Execs Admit,” www.money.cnn.com, September 7, 2006.
72
Nelson Schwartz, “BP was Warned,”
www.money.cnn.com, October 2, 2006.
73
William Marsh Rice University,
located in Houston, Texas, USA, is a private, research university set up in
1912.
Page 3 of 25
While BP has an aspirational goal of “no accidents, no harm to people,”
BP has not provided effective leadership in making certain its management and
U.S. refining workforce understand what is expected of them regarding process
safety performance.”3
– The Report of the BP US Refineries Independent
Safety Review Panel, January 2007.
“We will
use this report to enhance and continue the substantial effort already underway
to improve safety culture and process safety management at our facilities… I
intend to ensure BP becomes an industry leader in process safety management and
performance.” 4,5,6
– Lord John Browne, CEO, BP Plc., in January 2007.
BP – GREEN OR MEAN?
On January 16, 2007, the BP US Refineries
Independent Safety Review Panel issued its report (popularly known as the Baker
report) on its review of safety issues in BP Plc.’s (BP) refineries in the US.
BP, the world’s third-largest oil and gas producer after Exxon Mobil Corp.7 (ExxonMobil) and Royal Dutch
Shell8 (Shell), had been plagued by safety lapses in its facilities in the
last couple of years.9 The panel was formed in October 2005, after The US Chemical Safety and
Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) had uncovered many safety lapses at BP’s Texas
City refinery during the investigation of an explosion that occurred on March
23, 2005, which had resulted in 15 deaths and 170 people being injured.10 CSB said that BP might have
endangered its workers by compromising on process safety and because of its
emphasis on cost cutting. Calling into question BP’s safety culture, CSB
recommended that BP should form an independent review panel to review the
safety of its five refineries in the US.
The 11- member panel, which was headed by former US
secretary of state, James A Baker III (Baker), was critical of BP’s safety
culture and the leadership demonstrated by BP’s top management with regard to
safety issues. The chairman of CSB, Carolyn W. Merritt (Merritt) agreed with
this finding when she said, “Safety culture is created at the top, and when it
fails there, it fails workers far down the line. That is what happened at BP.”11
The panel decried a sense of complacency regarding
safety issues at BP’s refineries and BP’s emphasis on personal safety but lack
of leadership on process safety issues. The panel lauded BP for co-operating
with the review process and said that it did not find sufficient evidence that
BP might have intentionally jeopardized the safety of its employees through its
cost cutting measures. The panel outlined ten recommendations to BP and urged
it to take this opportunity to become a leader in
74 Heather
Timmons, “Second-guessing of BP’s Departing Chief Begins,” www.iht.com, January
16, 2007.
75
Nelson Schwartz, “BP was Warned,”
www.money.cnn.com, October 2, 2006.
76
“BP Attacked over Plant Death
Blast,” www.icsouthlondon.co.uk, January 16, 2007.
77
Sonja Franklin, “BP’s Browne
Failed on Refinery Safety, Panel Reports (Update 5),” www.bloomberg.com,
January 16, 2007.
78
“BP Safety Standards ‘Wholly
Inadequate’,” www.inthenews.co.uk, January 16, 2007.
79
David Robertson, “BP Failed to
Learn from Mistakes, Panel Says,” www.business.timesonline.com, January 17,
2007.
80
TJ Aulds, “BP, Steelworkers Reach
Agreement,” www.galvestondailynews.com, January 17, 2007.
81
“BP CEO’s Pay Fell in 2006
Despite Strong Profits,” www.money.cnn.com, March 6, 2007.
82
Nelson Schwartz, “Can BP Bounce
Back?” www.money.cnn.com, October 31, 2006.
83
“BP Seeks Part of Alaska Pipeline
Reopened,” www.money.cnn.com, September 15, 2006.
84
Jeannette J Lee, “BP Watchdog
Check’s Prudhoe Bay Claims,” www.businessweek.com, February 7, 2007.
85
Abrahm Lustgarten, “What Went
Wrong at Prudhoe Bay,” www.money.cnn.com, August 21, 2006.
86
David Ellis, “Safety Panel Slams
BP over Refinery Blast,” www.money.cnn.com, January 17. 2007.
87
Carl Mortished, “Opportunity for
BP to Lead Industry on Safety Practices,” www.business.timesonline.com, January
18, 2007.
88
Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., is
a leading global investment banks, and, securities trading and brokerage firms
in the world.
89
“Ahead of the Bell: BP”
www.chron.com, January 16, 2007.
90
Ed Crooks and Carola Hoyos, “BP
Faces Fight to Please Investors,” www.ft.com, January 17, 2007.
91
Investec, is a Johanessburg,
South Africa-based international specialist banking group.
92
Jane Wardell, “BP Looks to
Restore Battered Reputation,” www.forbes.com, February 5, 2007.
93
Carl Mortished, “BP Warns Safety
Worries Will Hit Growth,” www.business.timesonline.co.uk, February 7, 2007.
94
Jane Wardell, “BP 4th-quarter
Earnings Fall 22 percent to 2-year Low; Cuts Growth Targets,” www.examiner.com,
February 06, 2007.
Page 4 of 25
The Texas accident was not the only safety lapse at
BP. In March 2006, a huge oil spill was discovered in BP’s pipeline at Prudhoe
Bay, Alaska, USA. The spillage was due to a corroded transit pipeline.
Investigations found that BP had not been maintaining the pipeline properly.
The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration12 ordered BP to review the leak
detection system on the affected line as well as two other crude transit
pipelines in Prudhoe. Critics were incensed by the fact that BP had last used a
pipeline inspection gauge13 (pig) on the pipeline in 1998.14 This led to a criminal investigation by the US Attorney’s Office (in
Anchorage, Alaska) into the leaks. On August 6, 2006, BP announced that it had
discovered severe corrosion in its pipe and had decided to shut down the oil
field indefinitely. This led to an outcry against BP by the public and some
policy makers in the US. Safety measures at this oilfield had been neglected
despite it accounting for 8 percent of the oil produced by BP. Critics alleged
that BP had put profits before safety.
On January 12, 2007, BP surprised analysts by
announcing that BP’s CEO Lord Robert Browne (Browne) would relinquish his
position at the end of July 2007. It announced that the head of BP’s
exploration and production, Tony Hayward (Hayward), would succeed him. The
growth of BP under Browne since the mid-1990s had been phenomenal. So experts
were surprised by the move as Browne was expected to retire by the end of 2008.
Analysts felt that the safety issues coupled with other problems, such as the
investigation against BP’s US trading unit for market manipulation, declining
production and share prices, were some of the factors that had contributed to
Browne’s early departure.
Still
more damaging for the company was the fact that many critics had started
questioning BP’s environment-friendly stance and its corporate culture. Under
Browne’s leadership, BP had re-branded itself as an environment-friendly oil
company. It had increased its investments in non-petroleum alternative sources
of energy. Unlike some of the other big oil companies, BP had acknowledged the
problems of global warming. An advertising blitz that projected its new “green”
image was also launched. The company renamed itself BP from its original
British Petroleum and adopted a new logo and tag line “Beyond Petroleum”.
Though the initiative earned BP a lot of accolades at the time, the incidents
at Texas and Prudhoe Bay tarnished its reputation. Critics raised doubts about
BP’s environment-friendly image and wondered how a company with such major
safety lapses could make such a claim. They felt that BP’s drive for cost
cutting were in conflict with its efforts to protect the environment.
With the announcement of Browne’s early departure,
some analysts hinted that BP might have developed an “unhealthy corporate
culture” where cost cutting was given more priority than safety of the workers.
The problems of BP were compounded when some whistleblowers15 provided information to the
media which indicated that while the senior management was aware of safety
lapses, they still chose to do nothing about them so as to keep costs under
control.
BP denied that it had put profits before safety. It
said that it would implement the recommendations of the Baker panel and said
that it had earmarked billions of dollars to improve the safety of its
refineries and oilfields. However, some analysts still felt that much more was
required. The Wall Street Journal
noted, “Throwing money at the problem probably won’t be enough. BP’s culture needs to change, too. The oil giant
became increasingly dominated by a “Yes, Lord Browne” culture.”16
Some analysts opined that BP would likely face
significant challenges to gain back its reputation. They said that Hayward
would need to focus on resolving safety issues as his top priority. In February
2007, Hayward announced that safety worries could hamper the growth of BP and
it would give top priority to safety, even at the cost of growth. Some industry
experts believed that BP might take this opportunity to become an industry
leader in process safety management and performance. But others felt that BP
should return to being an oil company rather than trying to go “Beyond
Petroleum”. They felt that the prime duty of an oil company was to run its core
business to a high standard. So, rather than “pretending” to stand for
something other that petroleum, BP would be well served if it focused on improving
its operational efficiencies.
BACKGROUND NOTE
BP was formed in 1998 as a result of the merger
between British Petroleum and Amoco Oil Corporation17 (Amoco). However, the origin of
BP can be traced back to 1901, when William Knox D’Arcy (D’Arcy), an
Englishman, obtained a concession from the Shah of Persia to explore for oil in
the Middle East. When D’Arcy failed to locate any oil deposits despite having
incurred huge costs on his explorations, the Burmah Oil Company18 came to his rescue in 1905. In
1909, oil deposits were discovered in South West Persia, which marked the
founding of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company
Page 5 of 25
(APOC). During that time, Burmah
Oil Company held 97 percent of the company’s ordinary shares. That changed in
1914, when the British government acquired a majority shareholding in APOC. In
1917, APOC acquired a division of the German -based Europaische Union which was
under the control of the British government. From that time on, APOC started
using ‘British Petroleum’ as its trade name.
By the mid-1900s, the company had explorations in
Africa, Canada, Europe, South America, and Indonesia/Papua New Guinea, and
refineries in Europe and Australia. British Petroleum forayed into the US in
the 1960s, after finding oilfields in Prudhoe Bay in Alaska, and the North Sea.
In 1969, it acquired the Valdez oil terminal19 in Alaska and also acquired a 25 percent stake in the Standard Oil
Company20 of Ohio (Sohio).
In the 1970s, British Petroleum, like other oil
firms was affected by the Middle East oil crisis21. But, the company survived the
crisis due to its investments outside the Middle East countries and its
diversification into other businesses such as minerals, nutrition, and
petrochemicals. In 1980, British Petroleum acquired Lucas Energy Systems, which
manufactured solar panels. This deal marked the company’s foray into the solar
industry. A subsidiary was formed which later came to be called BP Solar. It
also diversified further into minerals by acquiring Selection Trust22, a UK-based mining operations
company.
In the late 1980s, the company expanded into
Colombia, the former Soviet Union, the Gulf of Mexico, Asia, and Africa. It
also diversified into gas, power, and solar energy. In 1987, British Petroleum
acquired Britoil, a UK-based oil exploration and production company. In the
same year, the UK government sold off 31.5 percent of its shares in British
Petroleum. The huge investments and accumulated debt resulted in losses for the
company. In 1989, the company felt the need to change its image. Its ‘Shield’
logo was modified and changed to green. It adopted a new slogan “Now We’re
Greener Than Ever” and painted all its assets green.
Despite these measures, the company’s share price
had declined during the early 1990s. It also faced pressure from external
agencies to stop polluting the environment. In 1995, Browne became the CEO of
the company. He realized that the company needed to change its policies and
re-brand itself if it had to survive in the industry. In 1998, British Petroleum
merged with Amoco. In 1999, BP adopted a new set of business policies based
upon the best practices followed by both the companies. The company borrowed
liberally from the environment- friendly policies framed by the erstwhile
Amoco. In doing so, BP became the first company in the oil industry to
emphasize the need for Health, Safety, and Environmental (HSE) performance.
On March 11 2002, while giving a speech at Stanford
University on climate change, Browne said it would be necessary to take preventive
measures to face climate change. He also said BP would reinvent its energy
business and would go ‘Beyond Petroleum’.23 BP believed that its HSE performance would be vital to its success in
the countries where it operated. In 2002, BP underwent significant changes to
project itself as a ‘green’ company. It changed its logo from a green shield to
the white, green, and yellow sunburst logo of Helios24 (Refer to Exhibit I for the old
and new logos of BP). The company also changed its name to ‘bp’, without any
meaning being attached to the letters.25 It also adopted a new motto - “Beyond Petroleum”. Through these
changes, BP strove to project its concern for the environment and its entry
into renewable sources of energy.
The apparent change in image and its business
practices earned rich accolades for BP. But some of its critics remained
unconvinced. They felt that it was hypocritical of an oil company like BP to
project itself as ‘green’. Its promotional efforts to project its new image
were also dismissed as “greenwashing”26 by some critics.
As of 2006, the company operated in 100 countries
with three major business segments: Exploration and Production; Refining and
Marketing; and Gas, Power and Renewables. The company marketed its products
under five brands: BP, Castrol, Arco, Aral, and AMPM. In 2005, BP’s revenues
were US$245.48 billion with a net income of US$19.64 billion. (Refer Exhibit II
for BP’s financial summary).
TRAGEDY IN TEXAS
On March 23, 2005, there was a devastating
explosion at BP’s Texas City refinery, the third largest refinery in the US.27 This accident was one of the
most serious workplace disasters in the US as it had resulted in 15 deaths and
more than 170 being injured. The accident occurred when the workers started the
refinery’s octane-boosting unit. Excess gasoline spilled into a vent system and
ignited, setting off an explosion that was felt within a five-mile radius. The
CSB sent an investigation team to the site on the day of the accident itself.
The Texas City refinery blast was the biggest accident in BP’s history. It was
also a severe dent to the image of BP.
Page 6 of 25
Under the US Occupational Safety
and Health act of 1970, employers were responsible for providing a safe and
healthy workplace for all their employees.28 This accident had resulted in over 1,700 lawsuits being filed against
BP.29 A fine of US$21.3 million was imposed on BP by the US Occupational
Safety and Health Administration30 (OSHA) as its investigations indicated that BP had committed more than
300 willful violations of its rules.31
The most devastating for BP was the CSB finding
that BP had endangered workers in its bid to cut costs. In late October 2006,
CSB revealed that although BP had known about problems at its Texas refinery
before the explosion, it did not fix them. Merritt said that though the company
improved working conditions and paid heed to personal safety (such as slips,
trips and falls), “unsafe and antiquated equipment designs were left in place,
and unacceptable deficiencies in preventative maintenance were tolerated”.
It was reported that the Texas City refinery had
had 23 accidents in its 30- year history before the accident in 2005.32 The report pointed out that
between 1994 and 2005, there were eight incidents at the Texas City refinery
(including two incidents of fire), which was a sign of severe problems.33 In 2004, in the twenty-third
accident, a worker was burnt alive. Daniel Horowitz of the CSB, said, “There’s
a lack of safety leadership in BP. There were inadequate resources for safety
at their North American refineries. And there were broken safety systems.”34 It was reported that the site’s
director had admitted that the refinery was held together by ‘Band Aid’ and
‘superglue’ for years before the tragedy occurred in 2005.35
CSB said
that a lot of blame for the accident should go to the cost cutting measures
adopted by BP. BP’s management had allegedly ordered a 25 percent saving on
costs, and were frugal in sanctioning funds for the refinery. For these
reasons, alarms and instruments were not replaced and leaking pipes were often
patched up using temporary clamps and valves. On August 17, 2005, the CSB made
a recommendation to BP requiring the company to set up an independent panel of
experts to review safety at the company’s five US refineries.36
Though BP
co-operated with the authorities and took full responsibility for the accident,
it denied any wrongdoing. Robert Malone (Malone), president, BP (America),
said, “Texas City was a tragedy; a lot of lessons were learned. And when I
listen to the trader tapes there is no doubt in my mind, what happened may not
have broken the law, but it broke our values. In my visiting facilities across
the country and talking to employees and management though I cannot draw a
systemic problem in BP America.”37
Following the recommendations of the CSB, BP formed
an independent panel to review its corporate safety culture, safety management
systems, and corporate safety oversight at its US refineries. On October 24,
2005, the formation of the BP US refineries independent safety review panel was
announced.38 The 11-member panel headed by former US secretary of state, James A.
Baker III (Baker) began investigations into the matter. The panel visited all
the five BP refineries in the US. It conducted various anonymous employee
surveys and also conducted public hearings. In addition to this, it reviewed
technical documents and also interviewed the management and employees of
private contracting firms who worked at the refinery.
As many people awaited the panel’s report (‘the
Baker Report’), BP settled more than 1,200 claims, including all the death
related lawsuits. After Hurricane Rita in September 2005, BP closed the
refinery for months to upgrade equipment and review safety practices.39 It also moved to improve safety
and bring in a new corporate culture in all its five refineries in the US. BP
had set aside US$1.6 billion to resolve all the lawsuits related to the Texas
City refinery incident.
ALARM IN ALASKA
BP’s image was also affected in early 2006, when
leaks were found in its oil pipelines at Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, the largest oil
field in the US. On March 2, 2006, a BP worker discovered a large oil spill in
western Prudhoe Bay. It was estimated that at least 267,000 gallons had spilled
out, making it the largest oil spill on Alaska’s North Slope.40 The spillage was due to a
corroded transit pipeline. The spillage brought back memories of the infamous
Exxon Valdez Spill41 in Alaska, and led to a public outcry against BP.
The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration found that there was “ineffectiveness of the leak detection
system to identify the leak” in the Prudhoe Bay transit line. The inspection
team found that the pipeline had several defects, including an area of the 0.375
inch wall that was worn thin by internal corrosion. The team believed that the
leak might have passed unnoticed for at least five days before it was
discovered. The safety agency ordered BP to review the leak detection system on
the affected line as well as two other crude transit pipelines in Prudhoe Bay.
Critics took exception to the fact that pipeline inspection gauges (pig) had
been last used on the pipeline in
Page 7 of 25
1998.42 Analysts
felt that the incident would lead to more fines against BP.
On August 6, 2006, BP announced that it had started
a phased shutdown of the Prudhoe Bay oil field after it discovered severe
corrosion and an oil leak in an oil transit pipeline. BP had to replace 16 of
22 miles of pipeline. Malone said, “We have now taken the decision to replace
the main oil transit lines at Prudhoe Bay. This will be accomplished as part of
our overall plan for ensuring the integrity of the field.”43 BP’s share price, already down
because of the criminal investigation by the US Attorney’s Office (Anchorage,
Alaska) into the leaks (of March 2006), was severely jolted by the company’s
decision to shut down the oil fields. While BP’s production reduced on account
of the closure, US production of oil experienced a decline of 8 percent. The economy
of Alaska, which was dependent on taxes levied on the oil industry, was also
expected to be impacted. BP said that it expected the oil fields to be reopened
in January, 2007.
The oil spill also attracted the ire of the US
Congress. Congressman John Dingell criticized BP for its poor maintenance of
the pipelines and called for a congressional investigation. He said, “It is
appalling that BP let this critical pipeline deteriorate to the point that a
major production shutdown was necessary. BP must take all steps necessary to
repair or replace problem pipelines quickly, so the American consumer does not
pay for BP’s laxity.”44
As of February 2007, BP was faced with another
investigation into this incident, as Federal criminal investigators began
probing charges that BP had substituted water for corossion-inhibiting
chemicals since 1998. It was also probing allegations that BP’s staff were
given written instruction against replacing deficient systems, pipes and
components due to cost considerations.
Replying to criticisms that BP was neglecting
worker safety and maintenance to cut costs, Malone said, “I’ve visited a number
of facilities and I not only test the management, I also get out on the shop
floor. I have not had an employee tell me that they were concerned to raise a
safety issue, or an employee tell me they would not hesitate to shut down an
operation they thought was unsafe. On Prudhoe Bay; there has been an 80%
increase on our spending on the corrosion management year over year since 2000.
Our corrosion experts said they felt that they were spending the money that
they needed.”45 He explained that BP didn’t use pigging to identify corrosion in its
pipes as it felt that UT technology was a better alternative. Since that
practice had led to the spillage, BP would use pigging in the future. In a
testimony before Congress on September 12, 2006, Malone admitted that BP had
“fallen short of the high standards we hold for ourselves” but denied that it
was putting profits before safety and maintenance. For instance, BP said that
at Prudhoe Bay the corrosion spend had actually increased since 2001 despite
the decline in production. (Refer to Exhibit III for Prudhoe Bay: Corrosion
spend versus production).
OTHER PROBLEMS
Apart from the safety lapses, BP also had to deal
with several other problems. Its US trading unit was accused of artificially
driving up the prices of propane in 2003 and 2004.46 In December 2006, US regulators
threatened to press civil charges against BP after an investigation into
allegations of market manipulation of the gasoline futures market.
BP was also struggling to increase its production
levels. On January 09, 2007, BP said that oil production had reduced for the
sixth consecutive quarter due to the shut down of its facility in Alaska and
delay in opening of new fields in the Gulf of Mexico. In fourth quarter of
2006, BP’s oil production had reduced by 5 percent over the same period of the
previous year.47 Analysts were disappointed by the production performance of BP. Mark
Lovett, head of British and European equities for RCM,48 said that though both Exxon and
BP had the same production issues, ExxonMobil had “hugely outperformed” BP. The
company’s share price was also on the decline. (Refer to Exhibit IV for a Chart
of BP’s stock price movement) . Analysts pointed out that in 2006, BP’s shares
had under- performed the global energy sector by 16 percent, ExxonMobil by 23
percent and Royal Dutch Shell by 5 percent.49
BP also said that the opening of BP’s two
production platforms, Atlantis and Thunder Horse, in the Gulf of Mexico had
been put off until 2007 and 2008, respectively, due to equipment failure.50 BP, which had a strong position
(due to its 50 percent stake in TNK-BP51) in Russia was also likely to face potential trouble as Russia’s
president Vladimir Putin (Putin) pushed for nationalization of Russia’s natural
resources.
BP SPRINGS A SURPRISE AHEAD OF THE BAKER REPORT
On January 12, 2007, BP announced that Browne would
step down in favor of Hayward by the end of July 2007. Browne had been expected
to stay until the end of 2008. Browne’s early departure came as a surprise as
he had been credited with transforming BP into a major player in the industry
Page 8 of 25
with a series of M&A deals.
He had also given BP a new image as a company that was concerned about the
environment, long before any of its competitors had done so. During his tenure
BP’s profits and market capitalization had grown fivefold and its share price
had increased by 250 percent.52
Many analysts felt that Browne’s departure was
brought forward to preempt the Baker panel report that was expected to be
critical of BP’s top management. BP’s chairman, Peter Sutherland (Sutherland),
was reported to be very concerned about the negative fallout of the report. In
announcing that Browne was leaving before the report was announced, the notion
that Browne’s departure was a consequence of the negative external report could
be avoided. Sutherland and other key officials were also concerned that some of
BP’s top managers would be named in the report. This might require them to
depose before authorities or even go to jail for negligence. Browne himself was
reportedly fed up with the spate of bad news over the past couple of years, and
wanted a “dignified departure”.
Sutherland, who had hailed Browne as “the greatest
British businessman of his generation”, said that since the decision regarding
Browne’s exit and Hayward’s succession had already been made, it made better
sense to opt for a handover in six months’ time rather than over a longer
period.53 Robert Talbut, chief investment officer at Royal London Asset
Management54 said that it made sense for BP to clarify the succession issue quickly
if the company was concerned about the findings of the Baker report so that
Browne could be left to deal with the disclosures.
While some analysts saw the move to call forward
the succession as a bold strategic move, others felt that market pressure was
at the root of Browne’s early exit. In January 2007, it was reported that BP
had lost around US$39 billion in market capitalization since August 2006.55 After the announcement of
Browne’s early exit, BP share prices rose by 1.8 percent.56 Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.’s57 oil and gas analyst in New York,
Fadel Gheit (Gheit), said that Hayward’s appointment boded well for BP. Jason
Kenney (Kenny), oil analyst at ING58 in Edinburgh, said, “I see it as positive news. They had a difficult
choice because there were a number of positive people who could have taken over
the role. The fact that Tony Hayward has got it will enable BP to move forward,
put the succession behind them and get on with the job.”59
Analysts expected a bigger shake up at the top
management of BP after the Baker report came out, as there were indications
that the report would be critical of BP’s top management. They felt that, in
particular, John Manzoni, the head of refining and marketing, who was
ultimately responsible for the Texas City refinery could be part of the
reshuffle. “If the report is bad, then more people might have to leave. There
is no doubt that sentiment has taken a big kicking. The oil and gas industry is
a hazardous business – your reputation is your license to operate,” 60 said Kenny.
THE BAKER REPORT
On January 16, 2007, the Baker report was released
at Houston, Texas. As expected, the Baker report was very critical of BP’s
approach to process safety at its refineries in the US. The panel said that a
lack of focus on manufacturing process safety on BP’s part contributed to the
March 2005 accident in Texas. It said that BP had failed to give process safety
the same emphasis that it gave to personal safety and environmental
initiatives. The report said that the management should have paid more
attention to earlier incidents, such as product chemical releases and fires at
the plant.
The Baker report also said that the top management
at BP had failed, as they had apparently ignored concerns raised by lower-level
employees. It noted that the role of top management in providing safety
leadership was paramount, and BP’s top management was found wanting in this
regard. It further said that BP failed to devote adequate resources to keep its
operations safe. The panel found that refineries in BP did not get the same
importance at BP as exploration. It was more of a “tolerated cousin” and was
subjected to budget cuts.61 The panel said, “BP tended to have a short-term focus, and its
decentralized management system and entrepreneurial culture have delegated
substantial discretion to US refinery plant managers without clearly defining
process safety expectations, responsibilities or accountabilities.”62 The report said that BP should
have learnt from three similar incidents in BP’s Grangemouth refinery in
Scotland in 2000.63 In fact, it severely criticized BP’s management for failing to learn
from those past incidents.
The report revealed that BP’s refinery at Toledo,
Oregon, was actually worse than the Texas refinery with respect to safety. In
2006, the Toledo refinery was fined US$2.4 million for its unsafe operations,
including the practice of keeping workers in vulnerable buildings near
processing facilities and failing to prevent the use of non-approved electrical
equipment.64 The panel found that in the Toledo and Whiting plants, there was
mistrust between employees and the management. Communication was also a
problem. For instance, in the Whiting refinery many work orders to
Page 9 of 25
replace damaged parts had not
been attended to for more than a year. There was also high tension between
union and contract workers. The panel was critical of BP for using a large
number of contract workers in its refineries. This problem of a large contract
workforce was attributed in part to the high turnover of regular workers in its
refineries.
BP’s Cherry Point, North Carolina, refinery was
rated the highest in safety among the company’s five US refineries. Though
there were some safety issues at this refinery too, overall, the report found a
good safety culture at Cherry Point refinery, with a “very positive, open and
trusting environment.” The panel also endorsed the elevation of Cherry Point’s
former plant manager, Rick Porter, to the new position as vice president in
charge of safety oversight. In his new role, Porter would look after the safety
practices at BP’s refineries worldwide.
The panel said that there were “instances of a lack
of operating discipline, toleration of serious deviations from safe operating
practices, and apparent complacency toward serious safety risks at each
refinery” - but it could not find sufficient reason to believe that BP had
intentionally endangered the life of its workers due to cost cutting measures.65 The panel made ten
recommendations (Refer to Exhibit V for the 10 recommendations of the Baker
panel). The panel made it clear that these recommendations were not for BP
alone, but for all other companies as well. The panel said, “We are under no
illusion that deficiencies in process safety culture, management, or corporate
oversight are limited to BP. Other companies and their stakeholders can benefit
from our work. We urge these companies to regularly and thoroughly evaluate
their safety culture, the performance of their process safety management
systems, and their corporate safety oversight for possible improvements.”66
The
report also complimented BP for co-operating with the investigation and noted
that many of its recommendations were already being implemented by BP. It also
noted that safety culture at the Texas City refinery and the Whiting refinery
were improving. After the accident in Texas, BP focused on bringing a new
corporate culture to the refinery. Keith Casey, who was the head of the
refinery in January 2007, said that he was in a position to call up Malone,
Hayward or Browne, if he had any issues. The top management also called him up
to know if any help was required.
But problems seemed to be far from over. As of
end-January 2007, BP was facing intense scrutiny from federal investigators for
possible criminal environmental and safety violations at its Texas refinery.
The lawyers suing BP said that the US Environmental Protection Agency67 (EPA) had joined a federal
investigation that had been started in October 2006 by the US attorney in
Houston. It was reported that the federal investigators were looking for
evidence that could be used to bring criminal charges against the higher levels
of management at BP’s refinery in Texas as well as the top management of BP.
CRITICS QUESTION BP’S “GREEN” IMAGE AND CULTURE
The Baker report was a big blow to BP’s reputation
and a major embarrassment for BP’s top brass. The safety lapses at BP coupled
with the findings of the Baker report led many to question BP’s integrity as
well as its corporate culture. Some wondered whether the oil and gas behemoth
built by Browne was “fundamentally flawed”. The announcement of Browne’s early
departure was viewed by some as an admission of its flawed practices. Investors
and analysts started to question the underlying structure that gave rise to
such business practices in BP. In hindsight, some analysts said the problem in
the refineries stemmed from Browne’s July, 1999, bold strategic decision to
reduce refining capacity by a third to counter weak profit margins – a move
that was widely appreciated by industry experts at the time.
Browne’s strategy of re-branding BP as a “green”
company had earned the company a lot of laurels. Its advertising blitz in the
2002 had differentiated it from other oil and gas majors. In 2005, BP was named
the Financial Times’ “most respected
energy company” and Fortune’s “most
admired company in Britain”. BusinessWeek
had ranked it in the second position in “the greenest company of the decade”.68 Analysts felt that BP did well
to earn that image in an industry where corporate ethics were challenged by the
very nature of the business – extracting crude oil, burning of fossil fuel,
dealing with repressive regimes, etc. With the safety issues exposed since
2005, some critics raised doubts as to whether BP was indeed as
environment-friendly as it had projected itself. They wondered how a supposedly
environment-friendly company could allow accidents such as the Texas City
refinery and Prudhoe Bay to occur. They noted that within the span of one year,
BP had suffered both the worst refinery accident in the US and the worst oil
spill in the history of the North Slope. Senator Dianne Feinstein, said, “I
have always respected BP, and I met John Browne and respected him. I thought
finally there was an oil company that has a sense of conscience. I no longer
think that.”69
Some
critics felt that BP’s projection of itself as a “green” company and its foray
into renewable
Page 10 of 25
energies, backed by the ad
campaigns were nothing more than a PR gimmick. They pointed out that its actual
investment in alternative resources was very small when compared to its
investment in exploration and refining, and also in relation to its profits.
Moreover, it was BP that had aggressively lobbied for the opening up of the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge70 to drilling. Critics contended that if BP had spent as much on
maintenance of its facilities as it had on advertising and lobbying for tax
cuts, it could have averted these major disasters. Some even said that ‘BP’
stood for a company with “bloated profits” that failed to fix “bad pipelines”.71
Critics said it was BP’s excessive emphasis on cost
control that had led to these environmental problems. An employee of BP, who
had worked in both Prudhoe Bay and Texas, had said, “The mantra was, Can we cut
costs 10 percent? There was an it-can’t-happen-here mentality on the part of
middle management. The values are real, but they haven’t been aligned with our
business practices in the field. A scream at our level is, if anything, a
whisper at their level.”72 Amy Jaffe, associate director of William Marsh Rice University’s73 energy program, said that there
was a “disconnect between the public emphasis on environmental sustainability”
and actual practice at BP.74 Analysts felt that BP had failed to communicate what was more important
– cutting costs, or safety and protection of the environment. Since the company
rewarded its employees for cutting costs rather than for steps to protect the
environment, they clearly thought cost-cutting was more important.
BP workers and union representatives interviewed by
Fortune in 2006 revealed that BP
might have known about the problems in both Texas City refinery and Prudhoe Bay
well in advance. Fortune also
obtained a 2002 letter written by an employee to the management predicting the
“catastrophe” waiting to happen at Prudhoe Bay. Some insiders had said that
BP’s culture was marked by extreme pressure to keep costs down, even if routine
maintenance and safety were neglected in the process.75 This made it more likely for
mishaps to occur.
Some analysts also questioned the corporate culture
of BP. Some critics felt that Browne’s legacy, so effective for the 1990s, was
no longer relevant. BP had to move beyond the “Yes, Lord Browne” culture that
had developed internally. BP’s organizational structure was decentralized -
broken down on geographical lines. While this structure was good for cost
cutting and mergers, some felt that BP had to change its organizational
structure and opt for a structure on functional lines similar to that of
ExxonMobil.
A few industry experts had also criticized BP for
looking at non-oil alternatives, saying that it would distract BP from its core
business. Some analysts felt that if it had concentrated on being an excellent
oil company, the accidents might not have occurred. ExxonMobil was cited as an
example of an oil company that despite all the criticisms levelled against its
business practices, had a much better safety record.
DAMAGE CONTROL AT BP
Soon after the Baker report was released, BP said
that it would implement its recommendations. Browne said that the findings of
the report were consistent with its own findings and were in fact already being
implemented in BP’s refineries. Browne also said that it would take time to
bring about big changes in a large organization and that still a lot needed to be
done. Browne said, “Many of the panel’s recommendations are consistent with the
findings of our own internal reviews. As a result, we have been in action on
many of their recommendations for a year or more. Our progress has been
encouraging but there is much more to do.”76 He assured the panel that BP would use these insights to become an
industry leader in process safety management and performance. He announced that
BP planned to spend US$1.7 billion annually until the end of 2010 to improve
the integrity and safety of its refineries.77 Browne said that the company had earmarked US$200 million to pay for
external audits from industry experts.78 Even before the report was released, BP had announced that it would
invest US$1 billion in the Texas City refinery.79
BP also entered into an agreement with United
Steelworkers, the union which represents 4,300 BP employees in the US, to help
improve the safety culture within the company. The union and the company would
henceforth work together on a joint safety initiative focusing on the 10
recommendations made by the Baker report. Kim Nibarger, the union’s safety and
health representative, said that it would push for a voice about who could be
appointed to supervisory roles in individual units. It intended to prevent the
use of “step-up supervisors”. “Step-up supervisors” were hourly employees who
filled up for regular supervisors in their absence. It was found that during
the blast in the Texas refinery, many of the supervisors were step-ups. The
union alleged cost-saving measures were at the root of BP’s practice of
over-using and keeping “step-up supervisors” in place for years at a time. The
union had for long argued that this was one of the reasons for the accident.
However, with the settlement, the union felt that BP was finally moving away
from a
Page 11 of 25
“blame-and-denial game” that it said BP had played
for close to two years. 80
Browne pointed out that the panel had concluded
that the errors were made in good faith. He said that BP never put profits before
safety. He felt that part of the BP’s problem stemmed from its rapid growth, a
series of mergers, and turnover among the management. He also denied that the
report had anything to do with his decision to relinquish his position at the
helm. BP also ruled out any reshuffle of its top management. Browne also
declined from commenting on his legacy, which was at the threat of being
tarnished due to the safety-related incidents. It was reported that Browne’s
pay in 2006, decreased by 28 percent despite of the BP posting a 15 percent
rise in profits compared to 2005.81 In 2005, too there was a decrease in his salary and bonus which was
attributed to ‘qualitative factors’ such as the lack of safety leadership in
light of the refinery accident.
Regarding the spill at Prudhoe Bay, Malone said
that BP’s decision to shut down the facility was evidence of the fact that it
had learnt from the Texas City refinery tragedy. “The reason we closed the
field was to prevent something from happening. That’s very important to
remember,”82 he said. After taking over as the president of BP, American operations,
shortly after the spill, Malone had established an open line of communication
with the top bosses in London. The company had earmarked an additional US$550
million to improve the integrity of its 1,500 miles of pipes, along with wells
and gathering centers. The inspection team was also increased to more than 100
people - compared with less than 50 people deployed earlier. The company also
planned to invest around US$195 million on maintenance of Prudhoe Bay by 2007.83
Reacting
to the allegations that BP had substituted water for more expensive chemical
agents used to prevent corrosion in BP’s Prudhoe Bay pipelines, BP said that it
had put a team in place to thoroughly investigate this allegation. In January
2007, Chuck Hamel, a long-time critic of the oil industry had levelled this
allegation, which he said was based on the evidence provided by an oil-field
employee. A BP spokesperson said, “Whenever issues are raised by employees or
folks like Mr. Hamel, we always look into them. We take these issues very
seriously.”84
BP also clarified that its safety lapses in Texas
City refinery and Prudhoe Bay should not be held against its efforts toward
protecting the environment. Malone said, “I understand if people want to say,
“How can you have something like this happen and you are supposedly a green
company?” … But we’re investing heavily in alternative energy, and we are
putting our money where our mouth is.”85 Reacting to the critics’ comment regarding BP’s corporate culture,
Browne said that the issues at Texas and Prudhoe Bay didn’t reflect an
unhealthy corporate culture; rather it was indicative of BP’s “strength of
character” as it had subjected itself to a meticulous review.
OUTLOOK
Analysts felt that BP was already on the “right
track” as far as its safety culture was concerned. 86 They expected BP to spend
generously on process safety experts, health and safety auditors, process
engineers, etc.87 Expenditure on equipment was also expected to rise. Some experts felt
that the order from the top was to spend – and this time as before, the
employees would fall in line and obey.
Some analysts felt that it would be a tough task
for anyone to fit into Browne’s shoes. But on the positive side, Browne was
leaving behind a “strong and well-positioned” oil company. Bear Stearns
&
Co. Inc.,88 analyst Nicole L. Decker, wrote,
“Lord Browne hands over a company that is extremely well-positioned to compete
in the future, in our opinion. Recent incidents aside, BP’s performance under
Lord Browne has been remarkable.”89 BP also had a strong and diversified energy portfolio. Though Hayward,
the CEO-designate, had been shielded from dealing with the Baker report in the
initial days, analysts felt that he would soon have to deal with the issues
raised by the report.
Experts felt that Hayward would focus on
improvement in safety as a top priority. Hayward was also reportedly in favor
of keeping safety ahead of costs. In an email leaked from the company’s
intranet, in December 2006, he was critical of BP’s cost cutting measures and
reportedly questioned BP’s emphasis on “more for less” and trying to do “100
percent of a job with 90 percent of the resources.”90 Analysts felt that a change in
BP’s corporate culture was another key priority. They also said that just
spending money on this issue might not be sufficient. Another priority would be
to ensure that BP’s production increased. Some analysts felt that Hayward
should continue to maintain BP’s leadership in developing alternative energy
resources. Hayward also needed to stand up strongly to Putin who wanted to
nationalize the natural resources of Russia, a BP stronghold. Some analysts
also did not rule out more extreme measures in the future, such as a merger
with Shell, or BP breaking up into two smaller companies.
As BP worked toward restoring its reputation in the
market, there were many challenges ahead of it. Investec91 analyst Tony Eccles said, “BP’s
management must step up to the plate. We believe a ‘business as usual’ approach
will not be acceptable to a skeptical market.”92 On February 7, 2007,
Page 12 of 25
BP modified its oil production
forecasts downwards and said that safety worries would hit its growth prospects
in the near future. Hayward said, “We have further increased our focus on
safety and operational integrity and will in some cases deliberately slow the
pace of our activity in order to improve safety and efficiency.”93 The company revealed that it was
facing a shortage of skilled manpower. It also said that it would increase its
capital expenditure in 2007 to US$18 billion from US$15.9 billion in 2006.94
While the debate regarding whether BP should be
viewed as an environment- friendly company continued, some analysts opined that
BP would be well served if it focused less on its supposedly “green” image and
focused instead on what it was actually supposed to do – improve operational
efficiency and create wealth for its shareholders. Ciat Murphy, assistant
managing director, Fortune, wrote,
“It’s too soon to know what has been going wrong and why, but it’s worth
pointing out that when it comes to corporate social responsibility, the first
duty of any oil company is to run its oil operations to a high standard …
Instead of trying to be the non -oil oil major, BP would be better served by
trading in the sunflower ethos for a steely-eyed rigor in running its core
business. Because in the end, the best thing it can do for the environment is
to be a good oil company, not to pretend it is something else.”
Exhibit I
The Old
and New Logo of BP
|
The
Green Shield Logo |
|
The
Helios Logo |
||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source:
www.answers.com. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exhibit
II |
|
|
|
|
BP’s
Financial Summary (In US$ Billion) |
|
|
||
|
|
2005 |
2004 |
2003 |
|
|
Total Revenue |
245.48 |
196.60 |
168.51 |
|
|
Gross Profit |
57.24 |
48.45 |
40.72 |
|
|
Operating Income |
32.18 |
25.75 |
18.78 |
|
|
Net
Income |
19.64 |
17.09 |
12.94 |
|
Source: www.finance.google.com.
Exhibit III
Prudhoe Bay: Corrosion Spend Versus Production
Page 13 of 25
Source: www.bp.com.
Exhibit IV
Chart of BP’s Stock Price at the New York Stock
Exchange
Source: www.uk.finance.yahoo.com.
Note: Stock price is in US$.
Exhibit V
The 10
Recommendations of the Baker Panel
1.
Process Safety Leadership: The
Board of Directors of BP, BP’s executive management (including its Group Chief
Executive), and other members of BP’s corporate management must provide
effective leadership on and establish appropriate goals for process safety.
Those individuals must demonstrate their commitment to process safety by
articulating a clear message on the importance of process safety and matching
that message both with the policies they adopt and the actions they take.
2.
Integrated and Comprehensive Process Safety Management System: BP should establish and implement an integrated and comprehensive
process safety management system that systematically and continuously
identifies, reduces, and manages process safety risks at its US refineries.
3.
Process Safety Knowledge and Expertise: BP should develop and implement a system to ensure that its executive
management, its refining line management above the refinery level, and all US
refining personnel, including managers,
Page 14 of 25
supervisors, workers, and contractors, possess an appropriate level of
process safety knowledge and expertise.
4.
Process Safety Culture: BP
should involve the relevant stakeholders to develop a positive, trusting, and
open process safety culture within each US refinery.
5.
Clearly Defined Expectations and Accountability for Process Safety: BP should clearly define expectations and strengthen accountability for
process safety performance at all levels in executive management and in the
refining managerial and supervisory reporting line.
6.
Support for Line Management: BP
should provide more effective and better coordinated process safety support for
the US refining line organization.
7.
Leading and Lagging Performance Indicators for Process Safety: BP should develop, implement, maintain, and periodically update an
integrated set of leading and lagging performance indicators for more
effectively monitoring the process safety performance of the US refineries by
BP’s refining line management, executive management (including the Group Chief
Executive), and Board of Directors. In addition, BP should work with the CSB
and with industry, labor organizations, other governmental agencies, and other
organizations to develop a consensus set of leading and lagging indicators for
process safety performance for use in the refining and chemical processing
industries.
8.
Process Safety Auditing: BP
should establish and implement an effective system to audit process safety
performance at its US refineries.
9.
Board Monitoring: BP’s Board should monitor the
implementation of the recommendations of the Panel (including the related
commentary) and the ongoing process safety performance of BP’s US refineries.
The Board should, for a period of at least five calendar years, engage an
independent monitor to report annually to the Board on BP’s progress in
implementing the Panel’s recommendations (including the related commentary).
The Board should also report publicly on the progress of such implementation
and on BP’s ongoing process safety performance.
10.
Industry Leader: BP should use the lessons
learned from the Texas City tragedy and from the Panel’s report to transform
the company into a recognized industry leader in process safety management. The
Panel believes that these recommendations, together with the related commentary
in Section VII, can help bring about sustainable improvements in process safety
performance at all BP US refineries.
Source: “The Report of the BP US Refineries Independent
Safety Review Panel,” www.bp.com, January, 2007.
END OF
QUESTION
PAPER
Suggested Answers
Integrated
Case Studies - II (MB3J2) : January 2009
1. a. i. Safety culture < TOP >
Safety culture is a term often used to describe the
way in which safety is managed in the workplace, and often reflects “the
attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and values that employees share in relation to
safety”.
Organizations with a positive safety culture are
characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions
of the importance of safety and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive
measures. The safety culture of an organization acts as a guide as to how
employees will behave in the workplace, where their behavior will be influenced
or determined by what behaviors are rewarded and acceptable within the
workplace. With respect to BP, the employees
Page 15 of 25
were more of a follower type
i.e., they adhered to the decisions made by the top management. They were
exhibiting their behaviors based on the rewards announced by the company. Since
the company rewarded its employees for cutting costs rather than for steps to
protect the environment, they clearly thought cost-cutting was more important.
Process safety vs. personal safety
The area
of process safety focuses on preventing fires, explosions and accidental
chemical releases in chemical process facilities through an effective alarm
system. Personal safety, comparatively, focuses on injuries such as slips,
trips, falls, struck-by incidents and strains. In general, process safety
focuses on workplace safety, and personal safety focuses on worker safety. In
BP though the top management improved the working conditions of the employees
and paid heed to personal safety (such as slips, trips and falls), unsafe and
antiquated equipment designs were left in place, and unacceptable deficiencies
in preventative maintenance were tolerated with respect to process safety. The
alarms and instruments were not replaced and leaking pipes were often patched
up using temporary clamps and valves that resulted in a lapse on process
safety. BP emphasized personal safety over process safety but did not ensure
that its management and workforce understood what was expected of them
regarding process safety.
ii.
Process
Safety Management (PSM)
PSM applies to most industrial processes containing
10,000+ pounds of hazardous material. It is the proactive and systematic
identification, evaluation, and mitigation or prevention of chemical releases
that could occur as a result of failures in process, procedures, or equipment.
BP had been obsessed with personal accident
statistics, the catalogue of trips, falls and road accidents, while failing to
focus on the safety of core industrial processes within its US refineries.
BP’s programs for analyzing process hazards did not
ensure adequate identification and rigorous analysis of those hazards. Their
corporate safety management system did not ensure timely compliance with
internal process safety standards and programs for managing process risks, nor
did it ensure timely implementation of external good engineering practices that
could improve process safety performance.
b.
i. Essential elements of a safety culture:
While many different models of safety culture have
been proposed, some essential elements have been identified as organizational
indicators of safety culture. These include the organization’s commitment to
safety, the involvement of operational supervisors in safety-related
activities, the formal safety system of the organization, and the
organization’s informal safety system.
•
Organizational Commitment. It refers
to the degree to which an organization’s senior management prioritizes safety
over production in the decision-making process and allocates adequate resources
to safety. In particular, an organization’s commitment to safety is reflected
by three major components, safety values expressed by senior management, safety
fundamentals such as training requirements, manuals and procedures, and
equipment maintenance, and going beyond compliance in giving priority to safety
in the allocation of company resources.
Role of senior management in
safety at BP: Criticisms on BP’s senior management by some
whistleblowers that in spite of being aware of the safety lapses, they still
chose to do nothing about them so as to keep costs under control. This
indicated that adequate resources were not allocated to safety by the senior
management of the company thus showing that it prioritized cost-cutting in
comparison to the more serious issue of safety. BP also faced criticism that
preventing fires, explosions and accidental chemical releases in chemical
process facilities through an effective alarm system was not incorporated into
management decision-making and also did not effectively define the level of
process safety knowledge or competency required of senior management, refinery
personnel, and contractors and that the management was not held accountable for
process safety.
Page 16 of 25
•
Operational Personnel. This
factor refers to the degree to which those directly involved in the supervision
of employees’ safety behavior are actually committed to safety and reinforce
the safety values espoused by senior management (when these values are
positive). These include the involvement on the part of supervisory and
“middle” management at an organization on safety issues.
Commitment
of the supervisory level employees at BP: With
respect to the commitment of the supervisory level employees, BP was criticized
for using step-up supervisors as a practice for cost-saving. At the time of the
Texas incident the company had many step-up supervisors who could not commit
themselves to safety and reinforce the safety values espoused by senior
management as they are not the regular employees. The union had for long argued
that this was one of the reasons for the accident.
•
The formal and informal safety system. It
refers to the processes for reporting and addressing both occupational and
process safety hazards, including rewards and punishments for safe and unsafe
actions and the manner in which such rewards and punishments are instituted in
a just and fair manner. It also focuses on the authorization and employee
involvement aspects in safety decision making, including empowerment,
delegation of responsibility for safety, and encouraging commitment to the
organization. With respect to BP, though it maintained a formal safety system
it was not effective, which was very important for an oil company. With respect
to the employees involvement in the safety decision making, BP did not
encourage a culture of employee involvement in the decision making process.
However, on the issue of delegation of responsibility for safety, though BP has
delegated substantial discretion to US refinery plant managers, the process
safety expectations, responsibilities or accountabilities were not defined
clearly. BP’s work culture did not feature any informal safety system, which
involves active involvement of the workforce in the safety process voluntarily.
Communication – Effective communication between management and the workforce is an
indicator of a positive safety culture. However, the employees at BP were not
empowered with a positive, trusting, and open environment with effective lines
of communication with their management. This also resulted in lapse on the part
of BP’s management in communicating the safety values to the supervisory level
workforce.
Performance
evaluation, corrective actions and audit system—BP’s use
of injury
rates to measure process safety performance hindered their perception of
process risk, which created a false sense of confidence that process safety
risks were adequately being addressed. Assuming the nature and possibility of
accidents as a result of poor safety management, it is important for BP or any
organization in this industry to adopt an appropriate performance indicator and
also develop audit system for ensuring the success of safety management
practices. Although they tracked some metrics relevant to process safety, they
didn’t understand or accept what these data indicated about the risk of a major
accident. BP did not have effective root cause analysis procedures to identify
systemic causal factors; therefore, corrective actions only addressed immediate
or superficial causes rather than the true root cause, which could contribute
to future accidents. BP’s process safety audit system relied on internal
auditors that focused primarily on compliance and legal issues rather than
safety performance or assessing against industry best practices. They also
failed to track process safety deficiencies to completion. BP’s “bottom-up”
reporting system allowed refinery-specific data to be aggregated and lost as it
moved up the reporting chain. Executive management either did not receive
refinery-specific information’s regarding process safety deficiencies or didn’t
effectively respond to the information it received.Therefore, the safety culture at
BP’s five U.S. refineries was not unified and was fraught with a lack of
operating discipline, tolerance of serious deviations from safe operating
Page 17 of 25
practices, and complacency toward serious process
safety risks.
ii.
The
following steps can be taken up by Tony Hayward to counter the criticism:
•
BP’s image had been severely
affected by the safety lapses. The priority for Tony Hayward (Hayward) would be
to take action on improving the company’s image.
In addition to the money being invested on safety
initiatives, Hayward should also address the cultural aspects that led to these
safety lapses. As the person at the helm, he should work toward making BP a
leader in process safety management. His rhetoric such as, - “We have further
increased our focus on safety and operational integrity and will in some cases
deliberately slow the pace of our activity in order to improve safety and
efficiency” – would go a long way in showing the company’s emphasis on safety
to the various stakeholders, especially the employees.
The communication has also been perceived as
credible as it was well known that Hayward had been critical of BP’s excessive
emphasis on cost cutting in the past.
But
equally important for Hayward would be to show decisive action and let the
public know about the
corrective action being taken - quickly
and clearly.
2.
At the very outset, it should be
noted that oil and automobile companies are the favorite
< TOP > targets of any environmentalist
group. The very nature of their business (i.e., extracting and burning fossil
fuels) put them at loggerheads with the environmental activists. When such
companies try to project an environmental-friendly image, they bear significant
risk, as allegations of being hypocritical and greenwashing are leveled against
them.
In 2000 the transnational oil giant BP Amoco
rebranded itself as “BP: beyond petroleum.” The rebranding was part of an
effort to portray BP as an energy company, not just an oil company: one that
incorporated solar energy in its portfolio and was willing to move away from
oil. BP replaced its logo with a vibrant green-white-and-yellow sunburst named
after Helios, the ancient Greek sun god. The logo was meant to connote
“commitment to the environment and solar power” and promote the new BP “as the
super major of choice for the environmentally-aware motorist.”
This was not the first time BP had revamped its
logo and appearance to improve its environmental image. In 1989, as British
Petroleum, it underwent a similar makeover. At a cost of about 100 million it
shortened its name to BP, redesigned its logo and refurbished its petrol
stations to promote a greener, more socially responsible image. David Walton,
head of public relations, said BP’s image was “a major commercial and political
asset. Like any asset, it has to be managed and looked after.”
The dramatic break with other oil companies on the
issue of global warming provided a useful diversion as well as a much-needed
refurbishment for a reputation under attack on human rights grounds. In 1997,
amid favorable publicity about its stance on global warming, BP’s share price
and profit rose.
Only the logo is green
Certainly BP’s record of environmental protection
has been no better than other oil companies’. In 1991 it was cited as most
polluting company in the US based on EPA toxic release data. And in 1992
Greenpeace International named it one of Scotland’s two largest polluters. Nor
has it become a model company since its apparent environmental conversion in
1997. In 1999, it was charged with burning polluted gases at its Ohio refinery
and agreed to pay a $1.7 million fine. In July 2000 BP paid a $10 million fine
to the EPA and agreed to reduce air pollution coming from its US refineries by
tens of thousands of tons.
BP’s existing and proposed activities in Alaska
have worried indigenous people and environmental groups. “Between January 1997
and March 1998, BP Amoco was responsible for 104 oil spills in America’s
Arctic,” according to US PIRG research. In 1999 BP admitted illegally dumping
hazardous waste at its “environmentally friendly” oil field in Alaska and was
fined $500,000 for failing to report it. It paid $6.5 million more in civil
penalties to settle claims associated with the waste’s disposal.
BP has invested heavily in solar power and
introduced a program to reduce its own greenhouse gas emissions. But despite
its investment in solar energy, the company remains committed to
ever-increasing production and usage of oil and gas.
And while BP has promised to reduce its own
emissions, it does not accept the need to reduce
Page 18 of 25
those arising from the products
it sells. Browne argues the company’s contribution is relatively small: “If one
adds up the emissions from all of BP’s operations and from all the products we
sell, it comes to around one percent of the total emissions from human
activity.” Yet this is a huge amount for one company to be responsible for, and
certainly a more important contribution than that of BP’s own operations. By
1999 BP’s emissions were greater than those of Central America, Canada or
Britain, according to Corporate Watch. And BP’s recent acquisitions mean the
company is now thought to be responsible for about 3 percent of worldwide
greenhouse emissions.
BP continues to explore for oil, often in
environmentally sensitive areas such as the Atlantic Frontier, the foothills of
the Andes and Alaska. BP’s North Star project involves the first undersea
pipeline in the Arctic, and the Army Corps of Engineers calculates that “the
total probability of one or more large oil spills is approximately 11 percent
to 24 percent” during its 15-year lifetime.
BP has emphasized its solar
investments while being attacked for its Arctic exploration. In March 1999 it
launched its “Plug in the Sun” program based on its investment in solar energy
and the installation of solar panels on gas stations around the world. Its ads
said, “We can fill you up by sunshine” but it was still gas people were putting
in their cars. For this program it was awarded a Green wash Award by Corporate
Watch. In a similar satirical vein, Greenpeace USA gave CEO Browne an award for
the “Best Impression of an Environmentalist.”
An investment in image
It seems BP is investing more in
image than environment. Would a company spend hundreds of millions of dollars
in solar investment just to enhance its reputation? Well, BP has already spent
that much just on its “beyond petroleum” rebranding. Research and preparation
cost $7 million; BP planned to spend $200 million between 2000 and 2002
rebranding its facilities and changing signs and stationery and another $400
million on advertising its gasoline and pushing the new logo.
In the end, despite BP’s rhetoric
about social responsibility, triple bottom lines and enlightened self-interest,
profits seem to count most. An oil company might invest in solar energy and
admit that global warming should be prevented, but it will do all it can to
ensure it can go on drilling for fossil fuels and expanding its markets for
them.
However, BP’s investments in alternative sources of
energies, its “green talk” and advertising campaigns resulted in many people
believing that BP was indeed committed to being a environment-friendly company.
But the safety lapses at Texas City refinery and Purdhoe Bay renewed the debate
on whether BP could claim to be an environment-friendly company at all. The
main argument for this was that an environment- friendly company would never
have allowed such accidents to occur. BP’s critics dismissed its investments in
alternative energy resources as a mere gimmick.
While there is no doubt that big lapses had
occurred at BP, it would not be justified to discount BP’s investments in
alternative resources. It should also not be forgotten that when other
companies like ExxonMobil chose to trivialize the threat of global warming, BP
was the first company to accept it. It should also not be forgotten that BP is
an oil company and extracting oil is its core business. It cannot be expected
to leave its line of business to project itself as an environment-friendly
company.
3. a. It can’t happen here mentality: < TOP >
The attitude of giving advices and suggestions is
common among employees and employers, but events point clearly to the fact that
both the management and employees are aware of the safety lapses prior to the
occurrence of mishap.
Why is it so that the preventive steps were not
taken, the issue is not taken with serious consideration when it was spotted
for the first time and no is willing to change. The answer is the attitude on
both sides, which is the “it -can’t- happen- here” mentality among employees
and to an extent, employers.
Reason:
The source of this attitude may be tradition, or an
ideology which succeeded in gaining supremacy in competition with other
ideologies.
Ill effects:
•
Such attitude offers no scope for
improving and upgrading the available body of Page 19 of 25
It cannot admit direct observation as evidence
because in case of a conflict the authority of dogma would be undermined. It
must confine itself to applying the doctrine of every individual.
The greater the coercion employed to maintain “it
can’t happen here” attitude in force, the less likely it is to satisfy the
needs of the human mind.
Human beings, over the years, aren't terribly
original in their behavior and thinking. History really does repeat itself, as
has happened countless times throughout the ages. We all have this "it
can't happen here" mentality. But it is happening, and we don't see anything
at all on the horizon to stop it. If something doesn't radically change, this
is going to make the situations much worst than before. Yet carelessness with
information and failure to take available precautions contributes to such
incidents as BP.
No company is immune to the threat of safety lapse.
Failure to take sufficient preventative measures is widespread, and following a
safety lapse or incident, most companies will invest in the very preventative
technologies and programs that might have helped avoid the incident in the
first place.
BP scenario:
The same thing happened with BP, it is not that it
lacks proper infrastructure and preventive measures, they were there, but the
problem is that they were just on paper only. When it came to the practical
implementation of those measures the company has clearly failed, and this
failure is caused not just by the management alone, even the casual attitude or
“it cant happen here“ mentality among the employees also contributed towards
havoc.
While industry experts agree companies need to
start assuming they will someday suffer a safety lapse and must have a plan in
place to soften the blow, they note that it's still possible to prevent a
breach with some common-sense preventive measures.
Measures to overcome this kind of mentality:
•
The only way to over come this
behavioral hurdle is the continued effort to educate people regarding these
risks and how important it is to not have an ‘it can’t happen here’ mentality.
Design of safety programs including safety training, should be
behaviorally motivated. Moreover both management and employees should keep the
fact in their mind that this is not an overnight process, it needs to be
addressed with at most care and sincere efforts on either sides.
Experience bears no relationships with work injury indicating that a
less experienced worker is equally likely to be injured as an experienced
worker. It implies that experience though helps workers in understanding the
physical hazards; however, avoiding the imminent danger is much more
behavioral.
Addressing variables like negative affectivity, job dissatisfaction, and
risk taking behaviors are therefore crucial in avoiding accident/injuries.
b.
Step-up-supervisors:
Step-up-supervisors can fill vacancies when the
organization’s full time employees are vacationing, taking maternity leave, or
otherwise cannot temporarily fill their position. This will help so that other
full time employees don’t suddenly feel overloaded in their workload or so that
the organization doesn’t fall behind but keeps functioning on schedule.
The step-up-supervisors can be hired for specific
projects. Step-up-supervisors can be brought in when there’s more work, and let
go when there’s less work. Allowing for the work to ride along with your budget
and not having to overpay for work that isn’t needed.
Pros
Enables business to adjust more easily and quickly
to workload fluctuations.
Step up supervisors fill the vacancies of the full time employees and
they make the work flow smooth and it results in decreasing workload on the
other employees
Can quickly provide the
organization with qualified staff. Maintains staffing flexibility
With the
popularity and staying power of flexible work arrangements, employers need to
Page 20 of 25
stay current with the needs of
today’s work force. Temporary work is just one of the ways that businesses can
offer flexibility and at the same time better meet their own needs.
Can evaluate worker without commitment
Based on its evaluation or preferences, the organization
can employ a step-up supervisor for a designated short term or, if desired,
offer a full-time position. Hiring a step-up supervisor can also be a good way
to continue getting work done while the organization searches for the perfect
candidate for the particular job.
Can save time and money
The cost of hiring step-up supervisors is often
cheaper than the cost of hiring permanent employees with benefits. In the short
term, it is generally more cost-efficient to hire a step -up supervisor. For
jobs that are expected to last six months or longer, it may pay to hire a
full-time employee.
Temporary employees can provide specialized skills
to all types of industries
Step-up supervisors are now employed in virtually
every industry. Traditionally, companies sought Step-up supervisors for
lower-skilled positions. Today Step -up supervisors increasingly include highly
skilled individuals with a wide range of educational backgrounds and work
experience. These individuals can tackle critical one-time projects that are
limited in time and scope.
Cons
Training Needs
Every time a step-up supervisor starts a new work
assignment – no matter how skilled or unskilled – a certain amount of training
is required in order for them to perform their assigned tasks to suit the
specific needs of the organization. Of course, if the same step-up supervisor
is brought back again, this might not be required.
Morale Issues
Morale and employee relations problems can arise
when the organization has step-up supervisor’s working alongside permanent
employees for months, doing the same work and putting in the same hours, but
not receiving the same benefits as offered to the permanent employee.
Safety Issues
Certain types of jobs are inherently dangerous and
require careful safety training. Studies show that frequency and severity rates
of on-the-job injuries are significantly higher with step-up supervisors. No
matter what a step-up supervisor’s experience is, care must be taken to see
that dangerous tasks are performed safely. Never assume step-up supervisors are
fully prepared to work unsupervised until the organization has taken the time
to see that they can safely perform their work tasks.
Legal Concerns
Recent court decisions have highlighted the fact
that businesses must be careful how they contract for step-up supervisors.
There must be no doubt about the workers’ status and about the lack of
eligibility for the benefits of permanent employees. And treat step-up
supervisor with the same respect and care the organization would have for the
permanent staff.
Step Up supervisors in BP:
It was found that during the blast in the Texas
refinery, many of the supervisors were step-ups. The union alleged cost-saving
measures were at the root of BP’s practice of over-using and keeping “step-up
supervisors” in place for years at a time. The union had for long argued that
this was one of the reasons for the accident. There the two basic reasons for
these allegations (i) the step-up supervisor cost less to the organization
which is the foremost goal of BP i.e., cost cutting. (ii) As they are temporary
they does not have enough skills required for the job specially industries like
oil.
4. i. Impacts of not adhering to Safety < TOP >
Financial Impact
Safety measures have implications for the finance
function of the organization. Organizations cannot ignore safety measures -
which means they have to have them in place even if it means incurring
additional costs. On the other hand, if organizations
Page 21 of 25
choose to ignore safety norms,
then they may be forced to incur huge sums on compensation in the event of an
accident or injury.
Compensation for workmen injuries
The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 provides for
the payment of compensation to workers in the events of untimely death and
injuries and disease. It is the responsibility of the employer to compensate
financially when an employee is injured at the workplace. The amount of
compensation depends on the nature of the injury as well as the employee's
salary. The purpose of compensation is to provide financial security to
employees and their family members.
Man days lost
Injuries at the workplace reduce man days for an
organization which affects productivity, and
subsequently the profits. To compensate for man
days lost, organizations hire contract workers. Some organizations provide
rehabilitation schemes to employees who wish to come back to work after they
recover from injury.
Operational Impact
Lack of proper safety measures has a major impact
on the day-to-day operations of an organization. Organizations may suffer
losses due to plant shutdown, production loss, and employee turnover.
Plant shutdown
Let us consider that a group of 10 workers are
allotted a job in an assembly line. One worker suffers a serious injury due to
the lack of proper safety measures. If the management does not compensate the
victim, other workers may strike, demanding medical aid, compensation for the
victim, and proper safety measures to prevent accidents in future. They may
have the support of all the workers in the assembly plant. If negotiations
between the management and agitating workers are not successful, the workers
may continue with the strike. If this continues for a long time, the
organization may suffer losses and may be forced to close the plant eventually.
Production loss
Plant shutdown leads to production loss. Employees
may be reluctant to work in a place that has no safety measures. This reduces
the productivity of the organization. A drop in production is likely to have an
adverse affect on the sales of the company which may have an impact on the
profits.
Employee turnover
High employee turnover is most common in
manufacturing organizations where workers handle heavy machinery. Organizations
that neglect employee safety are bound to lose their people.
Marketing Impact
Employee safety and health influence an
organization's image and goodwill. Issues like product safety and child labor
also affect the marketing strategy of an organization.
Image
Employees and customers have a favorable impression
of organizations that provide safety measures. People prefer to work for
organizations that care about employee safety and security.
Employees as brand ambassadors
Some companies use employees as brand ambassadors.
The purpose is to communicate to the public that employee welfare is the top
priority to the organization.
Goodwill
Goodwill enables organizations to gain competitive
advantage. Showing concern for their users and taking safety measures help
organizations build trust and goodwill.
ii.
The short-term measures taken by BP to deal with
the accidents:
•
Opt for outward recognition through promptly verbalized public
acknowledgement that a problem exists:
Acknowledge that people or groups of people, the
environment, or the public trust is affected; and that something will be done
to remediate the situation. The same
Page 22 of 25
thing is done by BP too, this is
clear from the statement of Robert Malone, president of BP (America), admitting
that “what happened in Texas city was a
tragedy and lot of lessons were learned from the
incident which broke the values of BP”,
BP formed an independent panel to review its
corporate safety culture, safety management systems and corporate safety
oversight at its US refineries. It has
settled more than 1200 claims,
including all the death related
lawsuits. It ensured to improve
safety and bring in a new corporate culture in all its five refineries in the
US. BP had set aside US$1.6 billion to resolve all the lawsuits related to the
Texas City refinery incident, and it has also announced that it has planned to
spend US$1.7 billion annually until the end of 2010 to improve the
integrity
and safety of its refineries.
•
Promptly ask for help and counsel from victims, government, and the
community of origin - even from opponents: Directly
involve and request the participation of those most directly affected to help
develop more permanent solutions, more acceptable behaviors, and to design
principles and approaches that will preclude similar problems from occurring.
Post-accident
analysis: It had done a post accident
analysis involving hundreds of companies, industries, and negative
circumstances reveal a pattern of unhelpful behaviors that work against
rebuilding or preserving reputation, trust, and credibility.
Plan to
learn: In situations similar to the
BP-Texas Refinery incident, it is ideal for the organization to plan to learn
as it executes its safety response and remedial actions. Besides, managers
detest dealing with accidents, especially once the urgent issues have been
identified. It's a critical part of any accident response process that a
lessons learned approach be in place so that the institution can learn to
remember the mistakes, the miscues, the successes, and the victories in real
time - meaning contemporaneously with problem resolution. The public expects
organizations to talk about and describe the lessons they learned from
mistakes, errors, accidents, or negligent acts. Speaking publicly about lessons
learned is a major corporate step toward obtaining public and employee
forgiveness.
Lessons
learned approach: Successfully managing future
safety plans often depends on the intentionally created institutional memory
the public relations counselor brings to the managing executive's attention.
The lessons learned approach teaches the organization how to forecast,
mitigate, or perhaps even significantly reduce the likelihood of a similar
situation occurring or reoccurring.
On the whole, there is no doubt to say that Texas
incident is a valuable lesson not only to BP, but to the entire industry.
5.
a. Reasons for an organization to
have an integrated and responsible approach to < TOP > governance, ethics and sustainability:
Business Ethics:
•
All business exists and operates
within society and therefore they should contribute to welfare of society. To
survive in the market, business should gain loyal
customers and perform social responsibility.
The managers of the biggest companies know as a
business gets larger, the public takes more interest in it because it has
greater impact on the community.
Thus business, either big or small, must operate on
ethical grounds and discharge their social obligation to survive in the
long-run.
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a concept
whereby organizations consider the interests of society by taking
responsibility for the impact of their activities on customers, suppliers,
employees, shareholders, communities and other stakeholders, as well as the
environment.
CSR is the obligation of the organization to pump
back certain portion of the profit they make from their business back to the
society, purely on voluntary basis, without anticipating anything in return. Of
course, in the long run it will automatically
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yield its desired result in favor of the organization, but while
carrying out CSR, this return should not be designed.
Corporate governance:
Corporate governance involves taking care of all
aspects and satisfying all the segments, in order to stay in the business, in
order to have that cutting edge and to achieve the competitive advantage. In
order to achieve this, it has tremendous tasks and responsibilities.
The
liberalization and de-regulation world over gave greater freedom in management.
This
would imply greater responsibilities.
The players in the field are many. Competition
brings in its wake weakness in standards of reporting and accountability.
Market conditions are increasingly becoming complex
in the light of global developments like WTO, removal of barriers/reduction in
duties.
The failure of corporate due to lack of
transparency and disclosures and instances of falsification of
accounts/embezzlement and the effect of such undesirable practices in other
companies.
Sustainability:
•
Sustainability means the capacity
to endure as a group, by renewing assets, creating and delivering better
products and services that meet the evolving needs of the society, delivering
returns to our shareholders, attracting successive generations of employees,
contributing to a flourishing environment and retaining the trust and support
of our customers and the communities in which we operate.
Consumers demand that goods and services be
produced by socially and environmentally responsible companies. Bankers and
investors evaluate companies and make decisions, considering both environmental
risks and environmental market opportunities. Consequently, more companies are
discovering the benefits of going
beyond
regulatory compliance, toward sustainability.
Hence an organization should have an integrated and responsible approach
towards business ethics, corporate governance and sustainability for effective
organization.
b.
i. In the case of BP, we have seen that it had an
adaptive culture. The organizational culture prevailing in BP in the mid-2000s
was set from the top after Lord Browne took over at the helm. The importance of
cost cutting and other operational efficiencies were ingrained in the culture
of BP. The importance of personal safety was also clearly communicated which
explained BP’s good personal safety record. This culture was responsible for
elevating BP to a strong position in the industry. However, there seemed to be
a disconnect between BP’s stress on process safety management and what was
actually followed. While BP’s values did not necessarily stress on putting
profit over safety, the dysfunctional aspects of BP’s culture ensured that
there were more chances for safety lapses to occur.
While the
top management at BP might have stressed on the importance of safety, the
message was clearly not effectively implemented by the rank and file. They
perceived that cutting costs was more important and viewed repairing of worn
out facilities and routine safety checks as additional costs. The problems were
compounded as the culture at most of the US refineries was plagued by distrust
between employees and supervisors, lack of open communication, conflict between
employees and contract workers, etc. The reward structure of the company that
rewarded people for getting “100 percent of the work done with 90 percent of
the resources” also contributed to the safety lapses. This incident has major
implication for how the top management needs to communicate its priorities to
the workers at the lower levels and monitor it effectively.
The positive thing for BP is that it has an
adaptive culture, so changes necessitated by the safety lapses were not
expected to encounter any resistance from the system. The statements made by
the CEO-designate Tony Hayward, that BP would even deliberately slow down its
growth to improve its safety culture, would send out a strong message to
everyone at BP that safety is really important. The other investments made by
BP toward improvement in safety infrastructure would go a long way in improving
the safety record at BP.
With
regard to corporate social responsibility (CSR), an organization has to ensure
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that its core business operations
are not only profitable, but also benefit the external and internal
stakeholders. The company must also ensure that its business operations are not
at the cost of the safety of its employees or the society.
If BP failed to provide adequate safety to its own
employees, it would take the positive image it had built up as a result of its
environment initiatives. The safety lapses at Texas City refinery and Purdhoe
Bay resulted in loss of revenue and led to pollution of the environment. The
Purhoe Bay spill affected the oil production of the US as a whole. It was also
a serious jolt to Alaska’s revenue. The accident at Texas City refinery led to
loss of life and injuries.
If BP had conducted its core business in an
efficient and safe manner, it would have demonstrated its responsibility to its
own employees. Considering this, we can say that when it comes to corporate
social responsibility, the first duty of any oil company is to run its
operations efficiently and safely.
ii.
Essential Governance Principles: A company
should:
1.
Lay solid foundations for
management and oversight: Recognize and publish the respective roles and responsibilities
of board and management.
2.
Structure the board to add value:
Have a board of an effective composition, size and commitment to adequately
discharge its responsibilities and duties.
3.
Promote ethical and responsible
decision-making: Actively promote ethical and responsible decision-making.
4.
Safeguard integrity in financial
reporting: Have a structure to independently verify and safeguard the integrity
of the company’s financial reporting.
5.
Make timely and balanced
disclosure: Promote timely and balanced disclosure of all material matters
concerning the company.
6.
Respect the rights of
shareholders: Respect the rights of shareholders and facilitate the effective
exercise of those rights.
7.
Recognize and manage risk:
Establish a sound system of risk oversight and management and internal control.
8.
Encourage enhanced performance:
Fairly review and actively encourage enhanced board and management
effectiveness.
9.
Remunerate fairly and
responsibly: Ensure that the level and composition of remuneration is sufficient
and reasonable and that its relationship to corporate and individual
performance is defined.
10.
Recognize the legitimate
interests of stakeholders: Recognize legal and other obligations to all
legitimate stakeholders.
11. Corporate
Governance Rating be made mandatory for listed companies
Thus by following the above probable guidelines for
effective governance BP can adhere to the core values.
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